Realists are however skeptical of any long term and meaningful change to nation state competition and dismiss the liberal interdependence argument. In viewing Asian regionalism realists tend to treat trade, investment and aid as tools for power politics. These analysts feel that multi-lateralism in Asia will not by itself provoke a liberal democratic order, but may actually engender conflict. Increased interdependence among unequal partners can lead to friction, especially when one side sees the other party as being unfair, as were the cases of the US-Japan or Korea-Japan relationships. This is especially certain when one party perceives that its vital security interests are at stake. In this case even rising economic interdependence is not sufficient to keep the peace. For instance, expanding economic ties with Taiwan have not dissuaded Beijing from threatening Taiwan with the use of force.

Realists are also skeptical of the peacemaking power of multilateral institutions. They argue that multilateral institutions in Asia have been slow to start off, difficult to develop and not particularly as fast moving as in other regions. The ones already in operation or new ones in the planning are often built on rather shaky foundations - of fear and suspicion and not on confidence and mutual trust. Past records of multilateral efforts, especially in North-East Asia have all failed. Compared to Europe and the Atlantic area, institutions and procedures of multilateral cooperation are still underdeveloped. In fact, North-East Asia has been most resistant to new forms of multilateral security cooperation. The region lags far behind South-East Asia in the level of trust and confidence in regional institutions to provide international cooperation. It is premature, therefore, to conclude that multi-lateralism in Asia will conform to the security requirement for peace in North-East Asia. In a region where hostility and mutual suspicion are rooted deeply in history and culture, the emergence of a new, shared sense of security community is an extremely slow and difficult process. This is especially true when we should expect a Chinese area of influence to divide East Asia into two spheres of influence with the other sphere dominated by the US.

Realists point out that historically the Asian area has never been a region of peace, cooperation or even shared values and mores. All of the major actors in North-East Asia - the US, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas - have all fought each other in the past. Even having multilateral security dialogues is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of radical changes in the political map of the region. For example, major internal political disruptions in Russia, China or North Korea can result in radical shifts of the region's balance of power and threaten peace and stability. Unresolved historical legacies, asymmetry in power, conflicting national interests such as territorial disputes and national unification are limiting factors in the regional security system. The region also lacks prior habits and experiences of cooperation. Thus, in North-East Asia multilateral institutions are not only underdeveloped, but even those existing are not looked upon as essential for peace and security.